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n 2005, a forward-thinking panel dared to predict the 
future of information assurance to help us better plan 
for it. Almost three years later, I assembled another 
fearless group of distinguished information assurance 
experts to give us insight into where they see our exciting 
field headed. Our panel gives 
insights into how the evolving 
nature of threats, the current in-
formation technology environ-
ment, and various market forces 
are combining to yield new se-
curity challenges and likely new 
technology paths for the future. I 
asked the panel some of the most 
provocative and difficult questions 
I could conjure, and they met the 
challenge admirably.
—O. Sami Saydjari, 
Cyber Defense Agency
What do you predict will be 
the most significant change 
in information technology in 
the next 15 years?
Whitfield Diffie: The rise of Web 
services. At present, everyone I 
know is vulnerable to Google: you 
can’t avoid using it, and if it were 
to hand your query stream to your 
enemies, you’d be screwed. Over 
the next 15 years, we’ll see the rise 
of many trade-secret-based compa-
nies that do everything from image 
rendering to statistical calculations 
to heat-flow analysis to things I 
know nothing about. No large cor-
porate program will be able to run 
effectively without using of these 
services, and to do so, it will have 
to tell its secrets to service pro-
viders. Webs of trust will become 
webs of contracts, and control over 
security will be out of the hands of 
any individual organization. 
The runner up and leader 
down the back stretch will be the 
introduction of WiFi. 
Dorothy Denning: I posted a list 
of famous predictions that never 
happened on the bulletin board 
outside my office as a reminder 
of how ridiculous our predictions 
can look down the road. Be that 
as it may, I’m fascinated by what’s 
happening with Google, map-
ping, and virtual environments. 
Perhaps we’ll have a live 3D Web 
that effectively merges physical 
and cyberspace with the help of 
zillions of devices transmitting 
live video, audio, and other data 
into and out of the Internet. The 
effect will be to amplify security 
and privacy issues.
Terry Benzel: The next 15 years 
will see the commoditization of 
ubiquitous computing. We’ve been 
talking about this for many years, 
and we see evidence in leading US 
Department of Defense and early 
adapter markets. Over the next 15 
years, computing will move from 
a stand-alone conscious activity to 
a fully integrated/always on aspect 
of daily life. Architecturally, and 
in terms of technology, we’ll com-
plete the move from workstations 
and laptops connected to networks 
and servers to embedded tetherless 
computational nodes and wide-
spread sensor-based systems. As a 
result of Internet communication 
moving from point-to-point com-
munication between hosts to mul-
tiparty information dissemination 
models, content-centric network-
ing and data stores will replace 
fixed information repositories.
Steve Bellovin: The most obvi-
ous answer is that we’ll see com-
puters everywhere, with complex 
interconnections and no perim-
eters. This will create interesting 
security challenges, such as how 
to teach the television I bought 
second-hand that I’m now its au-
thorized owner, that I’m willing 
to delegate certain—but not all—
watching and recording rights to 
my family, and that the previous 
owner should be excluded except 
for the right to retrieve certain 
stored content associated with it.
Jeremy Epstein: As computerized 
devices become ubiquitous (not 
just as laptops, BlackBerries, MP3 
players, and so on, but every-
where), it will become impossible 
to deal with the need to manage 
each device individually, as typi-
cally gets done today. While large 
corporations have dedicated (but 
overloaded) IT staff to manage 
complex networks, home users 
have no such infrastructure. As a 
result, manageability will surpass 
security as a key driver, for both 
home and business users. 
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Paulo Verissimo: First, computer 
systems will become component-
oriented, a concept that entered 
the car-making industry and 
started a revolution. Virtualiza-
tion, multicore, and multichip are 
key factors of success, but the fi-
nal enablers will be new business 
models from software vendors 
who should recognize this trend 
and won’t dare to charge as many 
licenses as modules or else risk 
being on the losing end to open 
source and free software; this is 
already happening in the virtu-
alization market. Consequently, 
the current trend to use a single 
physical-logical PC for everything 
will reverse—for example, I’ll 
eventually use my “office work” 
computer, my “Web browsing” 
computer, my “e-banking” com-
puter, my “personal theatre” com-
puter, and so forth. The fact that 
they may all exist in the same box 
is irrelevant because what matters 
is that they’ll be self-contained 
and noninterfering, yet will also 
have different levels of security 
and dependability. The benefit on 
assurance will be overwhelming.
Whitfield Diffie: Over the next 15 
years, virtual realities will move 
from a playland of gamers and ear-
ly adopters to the preferred venue 
for many (maybe most) business 
transactions. The security of vir-
tual reality is a barely touched 
subject. Online chat has destroyed 
the virtually impenetrable secu-
rity of a 10-year-old’s playground 
(the cost of having an adult im-
personate a 10-year-old is pretty 
high), and virtual reality has done 
the same to the relative security of 
the boardroom, the cafe, and the 
strolling conversation.
Bob Blakley: The devices we use 
to connect to information systems 
will become smaller and smarter, 
but also more specialized and more 
diverse. Most of the functionality 
we’re used to on our desktops to-
day will move “into the cloud” 
as connectivity gets more ubiq-
uitous, more robust, and cheaper. 
More information about every-
thing, including us individually, 
will move into the cloud along 
with this functionality, with the 
result that a virtual world of in-
formation will be increasingly 
commonly overlaid (via our tiny, 
portable, always-connected ac-
cess devices) on the real world we 
live in. This has profound impli-
cations for our view of security; 
availability will be both vital and 
assumed. Privacy will become an 
even thornier issue than it is to-
day. And information integrity 
will be essential to our safety and 
quality of life.
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Looking back 15 years, 
what were the big surprises 
in information technology 
that significantly affected 
the information assurance 
problem?
Jeremy Epstein: The big surprise 
wasn’t that we’ve made minimal 
progress in improving the secu-
rity of the software we rely on for 
everything from e-commerce to 
entertainment. Rather, the sur-
prises were:
Consumers continued to pur-
chase systems knowing that 
they’re flawed or at risk. It’s the 
“boiling frog” syndrome—if 
consumers and businesses knew 
15 years ago that they’d have 
to do regular patching and still 
would suffer periodic bouts of 
vulnerabilities, they might not 
have adopted IT so willingly, 
but because it happened slowly, 
they’ve gotten used to being 
constantly at risk. 
We’ve witnessed the whole-
sale move to online financial 
management without an infra-
structure allowing it to be done 
securely on either the client or 
server side. 
The dramatic increase in soft-
ware size hasn’t slowed, despite 
the information assurance prob-
lem. Fifteen years ago, we strug-
gled with security for Windows 
3.1, which was at most a few 
million lines of code, whereas 
today, businesses and most con-
sumers use either Windows XP 
or Vista, which have tens of mil-
lions of lines of code. 
Fifteen years ago we didn’t think 
we could secure a million lines of 
code; today, we’re sure we can’t 
secure tens of millions.
Paulo Verissimo: That the 
“popular” computing practice 
contaminated the “serious” com-
puting one, and not vice versa. 




became the workhorse of prob-
lem mending and the symbol of 
reliable computing, not only in 
personal citizen computers but 
also in what used to be high-end 
systems and infrastructures work-
ing to tight specifications, such as 
data centers, telecom, banking, 
and even cars and planes. If the 
situation is unpleasant and in-
convenient for personal users, it’s 
dramatic for serious computing 
applications in operator, provid-
er, and critical information infra-
structures. Professionals bitterly 
discover, after a couple of de-
cades, that they’re tied to hope-
lessly flawed technologies and 
are equally hopeless, in the short 
term, to make them better and 
more trustworthy. There’s not 
much of an assurance case to be 
made about information residing 
in non-trustworthy systems.
Steve Bellovin: The biggest sur-
prise was the change in the threat 
model. We always knew there 
could be profit-based attacks, 
but no one anticipated the cur-
rent alliance between hackers and 
other sorts of criminals, such as 
spammers, credit-card thieves, 
stock fraud artists, and so on. 
This—combined with the woeful 
security level of most desktop ma-
chines—has created a vast profit 
motive for computer crime.
Terry Benzel: The biggest surpris-
es were less technology based and 
more sociocultural. The impact 
of spam, phishing, and the cyber-
crime black market caught tech-
nologists by surprise but shouldn’t 
have. The surprise seems to come 
from the lack of connection be-
tween sociocultural communi-
ties and technologists. The rise of 
botnets is an excellent example of 
the bridge between sociocultural 
forces and technology. Myriad 
surprises emerged with the birth 
of the Web; the Internet’s original 
designers didn’t envision its cur-
rent pervasive uses.
Dorothy Denning: One surprise 
was botnets. Fifteen years ago, 
people programmed distributed 
computations across networked 
computers—for example, to factor 
RSA private keys—but the own-
ers of the computers volunteered 
the use of their machines. I don’t 
recall any discussion in the early 
’90s about how an adversary could 
compromise and take over a mas-
sive number of machines, organize 
them into a network with a com-
mand and control infrastructure, 
and then deploy the botnet for 
spam, fraud, distributed denial-of-
service (DDoS) attacks, and even 
money laundering. One of the 
first DDoS attacks of this nature 
was the February 2000 attack on 
Yahoo!, CNN, Amazon, and oth-
er commercial sites. Botnets are 
one of the most serious problems 
on the Internet today. The Esto-
nian cyberassault wouldn’t have 
amounted to much without them.
What do you think was the 
most significant information 
assurance advance over the 
past 15 years?
Steve Bellovin: The biggest ad-
vance was the development and 
deployment of SSL to protect Web 
transactions. It certainly has its 
flaws and limitations, but it com-
pletely blocked passive eavesdrop-
ping on credit-card numbers.
Paulo Verissimo: I think the most 
significant information assurance 
advances have been due to policy 
and practice factors. Important se-
curity technologies have emerged 
over the past decades, but many of 
them weren’t or still aren’t used. 
Banks know that if they all used 
certificates and mutual authentica-
tion, phishing would practically 
disappear, so why won’t they?
I can single out a few things 
that have led to significant infor-
mation assurance advances because 
they changed people’s minds and 
practice: liberalization of cryptog-
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raphy in most developed countries, 
the push for strong authentica-
tion, and trustworthy computing 
movements. We still need a lot of 
laws and regulations to put liabil-
ity where it belongs. 
Whitfield Diffie: This is hard to 
answer because there’s a trade-off 
between solidity and relevance. 
AES, for example, is a very solid 
advance, but Trusted Comput-
ing Group [TCG] technology, 
for all its political and technical 
problems, is surely the right di-
rection for critical information 
infrastructure, whatever the po-
tential for abuse in consumer elec-
tronics. In many ways, SSL is the 
most remarkable development: it’s 
the most widely deployed crypto-
security mechanism in the world, 
eclipsing all military systems and 
passing the previously most com-
mon (albeit low-grade) crypto de-
vice, the Zenith TV scrambler. 
Naturally, I also have high re-
gard for the security characteris-
tics of Open Solaris. Computing 
on a network (even if the network 
is inside a box) lets you apply net-
work security tools such as fire-
walls and is a major improvement 
over the von Neumann machine 
view. Socially or politically, the 
NSA’s change of attitude removes 
a major obstacle to widespread se-
cure systems. 
Jeremy Epstein: I disagree with 
Whitfield—although AES is great 
science, crypto is no longer, with 
rare exceptions, the weak link in 
the security chain. 
Terry Benzel: On the one hand, 
it’s easy to say that we haven’t seen 
advances in information assurance, 
but that isn’t quite true. The real-
ity is that there has been significant 
investment in research and devel-
opment, and there’s widespread 
use of technologies that weren’t 
previously used. We’ve seen an 
incremental improvement in in-
formation assurance in the areas 
of boundary protection, antivirus 
protection, and the use of cryptog-
raphy in e-commerce applications. 
The issue at hand is that these ad-
vances are nowhere equal to the 
exponential growth we’ve wit-
nessed in the threat environment. 
Dorothy Denning: I think we 
reached a tipping point in terms 
of vendor interest in developing 
more robust products, perhaps 
motivated by the realization that 
it’s better and cheaper to get rid of 
security holes during product de-
velopment than to deal with the 
public relations mess and patches 
after the fact. Nowhere was this 
more evident than in Bill Gates’s 
memo in January 2002, announc-
ing Microsoft’s Trustworthy 
Computing initiative. He declared 
“Trustworthy Computing is the 
highest priority for all the work 
we are doing,” adding “so now, 
when we face a choice between 
adding features and resolving se-
curity issues, we need to choose 
security.” Microsoft put its money 
where its mouth was, educating its 
developers and changing its soft-
ware development practices. 
Jeremy Epstein: Steve and Whit-
field are right about SSL being a 
huge advance. I’d further Doro-
thy’s comments on vendor interest 
by noting that there’s been a lot 
more energy put into (relatively) 
reliable automated patching sys-
tems, which allow us to survive 
despite the poor assurance of com-
mercial software.
Another major advance has 
been automated techniques to 
catch and stop many of the most 
common security problems (such 
as buffer overflows). Although this 
is simply a band-aid for a problem 
we’ve known about for 30 years, 
the widespread use of such tools 
and techniques (both dynamic and 
static protection) have had more 
practical impact on assurance than 
any theoretical advances.
The increasing use of Java and 
other type-safe programming lan-
guages, which have largely sup-
planted C and C++, have greatly 
reduced the types of security flaws 
we saw through the ’90s. Unfor-
tunately, new types of flaws have 
taken their places.
Bob Blakley: There were none. 
In fact, you couldn’t have picked 
a more perfect date for “the end 
of history” in security than 15 
years ago, 1992. My timeline of 
interesting information assurance 
events goes something like this:
1965: Gordon Moore proposes 
Moore’s law, which tells us by in-
ference that the security problem 
will get twice as hard every year.
1974: The TCP protocol is in-
vented, ensuring that universal 
connectivity will one day be a 
reality.
1976: Whitfield Diffie publishes 
the first unclassified description 
of public-key cryptography.
1979: The Anderson Report 
codifies the standard model of 
information security.
1981: The IBM PC is released, 
and it becomes clear that the 
majority of computers will be 
administered by incompetents.
1983: The Orange Book tells us 









We’ve seen an incremental improvement in  
information assurance in the areas of boundary  
protection, antivirus protection, and the use of 
cryptography in e-commerce applications.  — Terry Benzel
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1984: Fred Cohen describes the 
computer virus (which had been 
discussed privately among secu-
rity researchers for more than 
decade) for the first time in the 
public literature.
1991: The World Wide Web 
goes live, and the network effect 
becomes a reality.
1992: Nothing interesting in 
security starts to happen, initiat-
ing a trend that continues until 
the present day.
Despite the fact that both at-
tacks and losses have approximately 
doubled every year since 1992, we 
continue to rely on old models that 
are demonstrably ill-suited to the 
current reality and don’t inhibit 
the ongoing march of failure.
What breakthroughs do you 
see as likely in information 
assurance technology over 
the next 15 years?
Steve Bellovin: I hope we’ll see 
progress in two areas. First, we 
need to work on the human inter-
face. Today, people don’t under-
stand the consequences of various 
security-sensitive actions or simply 
don’t know how to do them. Sec-
ond, I hope we can design breach-
containment architectures in which 
the inevitable failures won’t lead to 
wider system penetration.
Dorothy Denning: Given the grow-
ing interest in trustworthy software 
and recent efforts to develop secure 
coding standards and practices, it’s 
possible we’ll see a breakthrough in 
secure coding. CERT announced 
in early October 2007 that it was 




automate the process of testing soft-
ware compliance against CERT’s C 
and C++ Secure Coding Standard; 
software developers will soon be 
able to run their code against For-
tify’s Source Code Analysis tool. 
Also in 2007 and in collaboration 
with CERT, SANS began issuing 
GIAC Secure Software Program-
mer’s certifications to developers 
who pass their C or Java exam. In 
addition, SANS offers training in 
secure coding. However, we still 
need colleges and universities to 
emphasize secure coding through-
out their programming and soft-
ware engineering curricula (not 
just in security classes), vendors 
to require their developers to fol-
low secure coding standards and 
their suppliers to provide code that 
complies, and customers to de-
mand software products that meet 
secure coding standards. None of 
these efforts will eliminate soft-
ware vulnerabilities, but they’re 
likely to make the problem more 
manageable and allow us to cope 
with the increasingly complex 
software environment.
Jeremy Epstein: Availability of 
low-cost hardware will make fea-
sible information assurance tech-
nologies that we’ve known about 
but couldn’t practically use. For 
example, the use of virtual ma-
chines is moderately feasible today; 
in the next 15 years, they’ll be-
come one of the key ways we get 
information assurance. Similarly, 
as it becomes feasible to have net-
works of dedicated processors in a 
single computer or device, we’ll 
see partitioning of applications 
with well-defined boundaries, 
which will help us gain assurance.
Paulo Verissimo: I think two ma-
jor breakthroughs will be closing 
the coverage gap in today’s sys-
tems security and achieving auto-
matic security. Both help promote 
system security and information 
assurance to higher grounds, but 
they require a paradigm shift, 
from intrusion prevention to in-
trusion tolerance—after intrusion 
happens but before failure. Intru-
sion tolerance can potentially close 
the coverage gap—that is, the 
mismatch between the assumed 
probability of the system hav-
ing a security failure and the real 
probability of that happening—by 
orders of magnitude. Further-
more, this could be achieved 
with mechanisms that ensure the 
overall system remains secure and 
operational, in an unattended, es-
sentially automatic way. 
Bob Blakley: Likely? Well, I’m not 
really a betting man. How about 
‘possible and beneficial’? Here are 
two: special-purpose security de-
vices that are simple enough to be 
highly assured, and universal surveil-
lance. Love it or hate it, the surveil-
lance society is here. On a broader 
point, however, breakthroughs in 
information assurance technology 
aren’t going to be as important as 
breakthroughs in information as-
surance policy. We’ve already seen 
the effects of California’s SB 1386, 
which requires companies to notify 
people whose personal financial 
information is compromised, and 
we’re seeing strong market effects 
as a result of the Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standard 
(PCI-DSS), which requires pay-
ment processors to use security 
technologies that are already avail-
able if they want to continue to do 
business with the credit-card issu-
ers. When our policy creates real 
incentives to solve security prob-
lems, the right technologies will be 
found and they will be used. Until 
our policy creates such incentives, 
no amount of technology is going 
to fix the problem.
Despite the fact that both attacks and losses have 
approximately doubled every year since 1992, we continue 
to rely on old models that are demonstrably ill-suited to 
the current reality.  — Bob Blakley
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Whitfield Diffie: Insofar as key-
ing, infrastructure is a capital and 
market development problem that 
I expect will fix itself. The other 
problem with PKI has to do with 
the fragility of software platforms; 
TPM and other improvements 
should help reduce the plethora 
of compromised (or at least un-
accounted for) keys that have 
plagued PGP and its relatives.
Terry Benzel: More incremental 
security technology may be mar-
keted as breakthroughs, but, in 
reality, incremental changes to the 
landscape will only continue the 
arms race that we’re rapidly los-
ing. An entire shift in approach, 
architecture, and technologies is 
required. We should expect to see 
breakthroughs in content protec-
tion and data-centric networking. 
We should also look for break-
throughs in policy and practices, 
liability, and data/information pro-
vider accountability. But we must 
concede that protecting the end 
hosts is a lost battle. 
What’s the nature and 
magnitude of risk that critical 
information infrastructure 
(CII) faces over the next 15 
years? By “critical,” I mean 
the part whose failure would 
have major effects on the 
nation, such as economic 
loss or loss of life.
Whitfield Diffie: This is hard to 
assess. My understanding is the 
security in the electric grid and 
other such information infra-
structures is a mess. I haven’t done 
the study necessary to determine 
whether the mess constitutes an 
actual vulnerability to an attack 
that would damage the physical 
infrastructure, but my intuition is 
that it might. 
The Protect America Act 
[editor’s note: see p. 22 for an article 
on the Protect America Act] creates 
a vulnerability that is novel in 
the communication system as a 
whole and more serious than the 
analogous vulnerability in comsec 
monitoring. None of our “real” 
enemies today have the resources 
to get broad access to US com-
munications. As we build in ma-
chinery for spying on our own 
communication system, we create 
the risk that the machinery might 
be captured by an opponent and 
that the cost to national security 
would exceed the gains. 
Paulo Verissimo: Large and ever 
increasing. Moreover, the objec-
tive risk is amplified by the lack 
of perception of the risk itself ex-
isting, by citizens, policy makers, 
and CII manufacturers and opera-
tors. There’s still a belief that the 
SCADA [Supervisory, Control 
and Data Acquisition] systems 
controlling these infrastructures 
are legacy, closed, obscure, and 
thus unattackable, or that it suf-
fices to just use a firewall and an 
intrusion detector, but normal 
ICT systems protection won’t 
be enough. To keep a long story 
short: Ctl-Alt-Del isn’t a remedy 
for things that have worked con-
tinuously for more than 20 years, 
many security techniques hamper 
real-time operation, and there’s 
still a difference between erasing 
a database and setting a generator 
on fire. This should be understood 
immediately or else we should get 
prepared for the next generation 
of mass hacking. Maybe all it takes 
for people to get serious about 
this is a www.scada_rootshell.com 
(Google the remainders of the 
classical www.rootshell.com to 
grasp the basic idea). It might be 
a good idea for policy makers and 
CII manufacturers and operators 
to learn the difference between 
crash and bang.
Bob Blakley: The biggest risk is 
created by technology vendors, 
who will continue to sell unreli-
able general-purpose systems for 
use in security- and safety-critical 
environments. Cascade failures 
will also become more common 
as interconnectivity increases, but 
targeted attacks by terrorists will 
be less common than economi-
cally motivated attacks.
Generally speaking, the threat 
will progress from “credible” to 
“serious” over the next 15 years, 
but my guess (not prediction, 
per Yogi Berra’s wise advice that 
prediction is difficult, especially 
when it’s about the future) is that 
it won’t become critical during 
this period.
Steve Bellovin: I see two major 
risks. First, many SCADA systems 
are poorly protected—think of the 
Australian sewage spill, multiplied 
by a thousand. Second, I worry 
about attacks on the financial sys-
tem. We’ve already seen how one 
rogue trader can destroy a ma-
jor bank (Barings). What could a 
clever worm do?
Terry Benzel: Risk comes from 
the combination of cyber and 
physical attack. A concerted well-
orchestrated attack can disable 
multiple sectors of the nation’s CII. 
We continue to be exposed to risk 
from incompetence as well. Too 
many networks, enterprises, and 
even home users are ill equipped 
and trained to manage the re-
sources at their command.
Jeremy Epstein: The risk is a po-
litical/economic one. If the drive 
to low-cost production and dereg-
ulation allows connection of CII 
(such as electric power systems) 
to the Internet, then the technical 
problems, especially as exploited 
by hostile nation-states, will lead 
to significant economic loss. But if 
political/economic incentives re-
verse, and regulation prevents In-
ternet connectivity (even though 
it increases costs), then the techni-
cal risk can be minimized.
A key question is whether at-
tacks on the CII are subtle and 
slowly building (in which case, 
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we may see the boiling frog again, 
as people learn to accept period-
ic low-level attacks) or whether 
they’re part of a massive attack 
(along the lines of 9/11 or Pearl 
Harbor, in which case there could 
be meaningful changes to how we 
protect the infrastructure).
Dorothy Denning: Too many 
variables are at play here, plus little 
to no data about any of them, to 
come up with any reasonably ac-
curate estimate of the risk. The 
catastrophic failures people write 
and worry about are typically 
based on fictive scenarios that go 
beyond the cyberthreats that actu-
ally confront us. So far, our worst 
enemy, Al Qaeda, hasn’t dem-
onstrated a capability to conduct 
very sophisticated cyberattacks. 
But over the next 15 years, things 
will change.
How do you see adversary 
capabilities changing over 
the next 15 years, based on 
what we’ve seen evolve over 
the past 15?
Whitfield Diffie: If I’m to believe 
the scholars of botnets, we might 
be facing an imminent crisis. 
Computing and communications 
are sinking into human culture. 
High tech is no longer protected 
by a general obscurity, but it isn’t 
adapting fast enough to the secu-
rity needs of a world in which in-
formation gets around really well. 
We can expect groups all over the 
world to explore network intel-
ligence and information warfare. 
Many people worldwide are smart 
and well educated; as they put 
their minds to penetration, the 
playing field will change beyond 
recognition. 
We’re 19 years from the Morris 
worm, which—although disrup-
tive—was a failure because of its 
author’s lack of access to captive 
networks in which to debug it. In 
the time since, we’ve seen worms 
take over large parts of the Inter-
net—first in hours, then minutes. 
People have talked about viruses 
and worms since at least 1971 
(when I first heard the notion), 
perhaps even since the 1950s, but 
the scale of the vulnerability took 
us almost completely by surprise.
In the past 15 years, we’ve seen 
a steady attack on security—in the 
name of security—by people who 
see secure communications by our 
enemies as a greater hazard than 
secure communication by our 
friends as a benefit. Should cryp-
tography and its supporting tech-
nologies become a serious problem 
for national intelligence, they’ll 
once again come under attack.
Jeremy Epstein: The big change 
will be government organiza-
tions realizing that vendors and 
the public won’t respond to scare 
tactics, especially with regard to 
foreign threats. The Bush admin-
istration’s misrepresentation of in-
telligence in Iraq greatly reduced 
Americans’ willingness to accept 
statements from government of-
ficials at face value, and this will 
carry over into the information 
assurance arena. As a result, we’ll 
see more openness by govern-
ment agencies in explaining spe-
cifics of international threats and 
the motivations and capabilities of 
foreign nation-states.
On the technical side, adversar-
ies will develop more automated 
means of finding application vul-
nerabilities, which will overtake 
infrastructure as the primary focus 
of attacks. 
Dorothy Denning: There has been 
steady progress in the develop-
ment of software tools for auto-
mated attacks such as phishing 
and the herding, control, and ap-
plication of botnets. In addition, 
underground markets that trade 
in attack tools and stolen data such 
as credit-card numbers are thriv-
ing. These trends will continue, 
mitigating some of the benefits 
that would otherwise come from 
improved security. But even more 
worrisome, we may see devel-
opment of and traffic in exploit 
tools aimed at SCADA systems 
and other control systems that 
impact physical devices, critical 
infrastructures, and life-critical 
applications. Already, we’re start-
ing to see disclosures of SCADA 
vulnerabilities. Fifteen years from 
now, we could see actual tools for 
attacking automobiles, robots, im-
plants, remote surgeries, or energy 
systems instead of just Web sites, 
servers, and PCs.
Bob Blakley: Adversaries will have 
better education, funding, and in-
formation about the systems they 
attack. This isn’t entirely a bad 
thing, however: organized crime 
could be more expensive but less 
chaotic than disorganized crime.
Paulo Verissimo: Let me start by 
qualifying the adversaries. To me, 
they’re computer experts who live 
on the dark side—the Darth Va-
ders of the computer science and 
engineering profession. Since the 
advent of the Internet and the 
Web, the power of these adversar-
ies—that is, their capacity to stage 
attacks on real ground—has been 
leveraged enormously by influ-
encing hosts of script kids and less 
gifted hackers, by putting recipes 
on the Web, and by using com-
puter hosts (zombie botnets) that 
let them deploy massive attack 
tactics. The DDoS set of attacks 
in February 2000 was just the be-
ginning of a new era, from hack-
ing for the masses to hacking by 
the masses.
Adversaries’ business models 
could also extend to infrastruc-
tures that will become completely 
pervasive in a few years, such as 
passport and travel control sys-
tems, identity or medical card 
systems, and electronic voting 
systems. It’s almost unthinkable 
to admit that these infrastruc-
tures could be vulnerable, but the 
problems already faced around 
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the world in these kinds of sys-
tems, from e-voting to electronic 
passports, make me believe some 
clouds are ahead.
Terry Benzel: Cybercrime is a 
growing segment of our economy. 
Well-funded, focused adversar-
ies and nation-states will benefit 
from new technologies, tools, and 
organization that will help them 
stay one step ahead of the defen-
sive security industries. Adversar-
ies will also be able to exercise the 
increasing interconnectedness and 
interdependence in our systems. 
The interesting question is where 
cyberattack will focus as we move 
to the more ubiquitous comput-
ing model.
Steve Bellovin: I think they’re go-
ing to get stealthier. Malware will 
be harder to find, harder to de-
tect when in operation, and much 
harder to remove. Among other 
things, I think it likely that ad-
versaries will exploit technologies 
like DRM and nominally locked-
down appliances.
What question should I 
have asked regarding this 
information assurance 
technology forecast that I 
didn’t ask, and what would 
your answer be?
Whitfield Diffie: “What advances 
in information security will not 
be made in the next 15 years?” 
The answer would be that we 
probably won’t get much further 
in proving things, either that our 
code is correct or that crypto al-
gorithms are secure.
You didn’t mention forensics 
and counterforensics, a major trend 
in security to come within the so-
cial fabric. Military comsec failures 
don’t allow appeal: if you didn’t 
protect your transmissions, you 
won’t get far complaining about 
being exploited. Commercial secu-
rity failures are quite different, and 
if you collected the right evidence, 
you could recover by suing.
You also haven’t mentioned the 
laptop security problem—securing 
equipment versus securing events. 
If you encrypt data with your 
laptop and send it somewhere, an 
opponent who intercepts the mes-
sage must confront the crypto. On 
the other hand, someone who has 
the laptop could well find the key 
lying around somewhere. Trying 
every consecutive 16 Bytes on a 
gigabyte disk is a workfactor of 
around 226 to 240, a big improve-
ment on 2128, and being sure that 
the key isn’t anywhere on your 
disk isn’t easy.
Dorothy Denning: If you had 
$100 million to invest in security 
technology research, where would 
you put it? I’m not sure, so I really 
want to hear what others have to 
say, but I’d consider putting it in 
technologies for network service 
providers to facilitate network-
wide defense—for example, to 
detect and shut down botnets and 
the Web sites used for phishing 
and malware distribution, as well 
as other pervasive threats.
Jeremy Epstein: I’d take Doro-
thy’s $100 million and invest it in 
figuring out how to make systems 
that are more intuitive to manage 
securely. We have novices manag-
ing our systems, and that’s not go-
ing to change. We have to make it 
easier for them.
Bob Blakley: Why, in the face of 
steadily escalating threats and loss-
es, do we continue to cling to old 
security models that have demon-
strably failed to solve the problem? 
Why, for example, do we think 
that intrusion detection, biomet-
rics, secure software development, 
and quantum cryptography will 
solve problems that are manifestly 
not susceptible to their use? And 
why don’t we recognize that the 
priority of security requirements 
has changed from “confidentiality, 
integrity, availability” to “avail-
ability, accountability, integrity, 
confidentiality”? Or that the pri-
ority of mechanisms has changed 
from prevention to detection and 
recovery? Or that authorization 
doesn’t scale, but accountability 
does? Or that general-purpose sys-
tems can’t be secured, but special 
purpose systems might be?
Terry Benzel: We need to broaden 
the discussion to include sociocul-
tural and economic issues. We can 
no longer be technologists in isola-
tion. All too often, we suffer from 
technologists with a hammer in 
search of a nail. Taking the discus-
sion in this direction might force 
us to get realistic about what we 
can reasonable protect and what 
we should concede as wild terri-
tory. We need to perform cost-
 benefit trades to ask and answer 
some hard questions.
Bob Blakley: Terry’s dead right 
about that, and it’s extremely im-
portant.
Steve Bellovin: You should have 
asked me how the threat model will 
change. I suspect we’re going to see 
many more targeted attacks, both 
for profit and for national interest. If 
I may indulge in a geeky pun, let-
ters of marque will be replaced by 
letters of mark and space. 
If you had $100 million to invest in security technology 
research, where would you put it? I’d consider putting it 
in technologies for network service providers to facilitate 
network-wide defense.  —Dorothy Denning
